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In recent years, there have been increasing concerns among academics and policy makers 
about the real consequences of large swings in prices of assets, such as equities and property. 
Banks, the dominant financial institutions in most countries, are an important part of the interaction 
between the real and financial sectors of the economy. They typically have significant exposure to 
the asset markets, either through their lending to the real estate sector or, in many countries, through 
their direct holdings of stocks and land. Therefore, the booms and busts in asset markets are likely 
to affect the financial conditions of banks. Thus, how shocks to bank health or liquidity, as a result 
of volatile equity and property prices, influence corporate investment and performance is critical to 
our understanding of the real effect of “bubbles” (or extreme movements in asset prices). 
The objective of this paper is to provide evidence of the real consequences of bubbles by 
identifying and quantifying the economic impact of an adverse liquidity shock to banks induced by 
a large decline in the asset market. There are two necessary conditions for such a “lending channel” 
to work. First, as pointed out by Stein (1998), banks are credit constrained as the asymmetric 
information problem in the capital market prevents them from issuing uninsured debt and/or equity 
to offset a shortage of liquidity. Thus a shock to the financial conditions of banks results in reduced 
lending. Second, as emphasized in the recent banking literature (see James and Smith (2000) for a 
survey), bank loans are special and banking relationships are valuable.  Consequently, when an 
exogenous shock forces banks to cut back on lending, firms cannot readily substitute other sources 
of financing. Thus, firms face less available credit, which results in reduced investment and worse 
performance. These two hypotheses collectively characterize the mechanism of a lending channel 
through which an adverse bank liquidity shock may affect the real sector. So far, however, there 
have not been any studies that directly test both of these two hypotheses.1  
The dramatic collapse in the land market in Japan in the early 1990s provides a natural 
laboratory to test these two hypotheses. Between 1990 and 1993, there was almost a 50% drop in 
land prices. Japanese banks historically had significant exposure to the land market, both through 
their lending to the real estate sector and through their direct holding of land. At the end of 1989, 
banks on average held 6.4% of their assets in real estate loans and, if marked to market, carried 
7.9% of land on their book. This institutional background helps me to overcome an important 
empirical difficulty in separating the economic impact of a loan supply shock from 
contemporaneous demand shocks, namely, the endogeneity of bank financial condition to firm 
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performance. When land prices dropped by half in Japan, a shock that is unambiguously exogenous 
to any individual bank, banks were hurt differentially according to their exposure to the real estate 
sector prior to the shock. Thus the collapse of land prices induced an exogenous variation in the 
financial conditions of banks that is unlikely to be related to firm performance.  
More importantly, this setting, along with a unique dataset of matched bank-firm loans, 
helps to deal with another source of endogeneity -- endogenous selection of bank-firm relationships. 
For example, the same shocks that trigger banking problems may also reduce firms’ investment 
opportunities and thus their demand for credit. In addition, the adverse shock might hurt the balance 
sheets of borrowers and their credit worthiness, resulting in lower borrowing capacities. If firms 
more affected by the adverse shock somehow are selected into banks with more real estate 
exposure, one would observe a spurious relationship between a shock to bank financial condition 
and firm performance. This paper deals with this problem by employing a rich dataset of matched 
loans between banks and firms. These data allow me to exploit the fact that there are firms that 
borrow from multiple banks with different levels of real estate exposure. I can examine whether the 
same firm borrowing from two different banks would receive less financing from the bank with 
more real estate exposure. 
Two sets of results are presented that characterize how the burst of the bubble in the 
property market in Japan in the early 1990s is transmitted to firms in the manufacturing sector, 
whose demand for credit is not directly affected by the shock. I first use the individual loan level 
data to show that, after fully controlling for borrower characteristics, banks with greater exposure to 
the real estate sector prior to the shock had to cut back lending.  This finding supports the view that 
banks are credit constrained and that an exogenous shock to bank liquidity leads to reduced lending. 
The second set of results is at the individual firm level. Japanese industrial firms receive, on 
average, about one-third of their loans from their largest lenders. I find that the exposure of the top 
lender to the real estate sector negatively affected firms’ fixed investment and stock market 
valuation, which supports the view that reduced bank financing forces firms to pass up profitable 
investment opportunities. The lending channel is economically important: the shock from the real 
estate market accounts for almost one-third of economy-wide contraction in bank lending to the 
manufacturing sector and accounts for about one-fifth of the decline in fixed investment and a 
quarter of the drop in stock market valuation. To my knowledge this is the first study that provides 
large-sample loan-level evidence on how a shock to banks influences firms’ investment behavior 
and stock market performance.2 Moreover, based on a large sample of publicly traded firms and 
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banks, this paper quantifies the economy-wide impact of a collapse in the property market through 
the lending channel. 
This paper extends a few strands of empirical literature at both the micro and the macro 
levels. The first is the literature on valuable banking relationships, which is related to the second 
hypotheses discussed above. Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1993), Gibson (1995), and Kang and 
Stulz (2000) pioneered the approach of using the effect of bank distress announcements on client 
firms’ performance as evidence of valuable banking relationships. As is discussed in more detail 
later, however, the results in the subsequent work are mixed (e.g. Bae, Kang, and Lim (2002); 
Ongena, Smith, and Michalsen (2003)). Related to the first hypothesis in this paper, a strand of 
literature examines how changes in monetary policy affect bank lending activities, i.e., the “credit 
channel” (see Bernanke and Gertler (1995) for a survey). The main challenge is to separate a loan 
supply effect from a loan demand effect. Recent work by Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Campello 
(2002) addresses this concern by exploiting variations in banks’ access to liquidity to identify the 
credit channel of monetary transmission. The third strand of literature has used aggregate data to 
examine whether a bank loan supply shock affects economic activity. The results are, again, mixed 
(e.g., Bernanke (1983); Peek and Rosengren (2000); Ashcraft (2006)).  Some of the inconsistencies 
in the previous studies are likely due to the empirical difficulties discussed above. More 
importantly, they point to the importance of using disaggregated data at the loan level and the firm 
level to pin down the mechanism through which shocks to banks affect client firms so that causality 
can be established. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the natural experiment. Section 3 
presents the loan-level evidence on the effect of a shock to banks. Section 4 presents the firm-level 
evidence on the effect of a shock to banks. Finally, Section 5 presents a conclusion.  
 
I. The Land-Price Collapse as a Natural Experiment 
 
1.1. Previous Studies on the Effect of Bank Health 
Researchers have studied the second hypothesis of a lending channel, i.e., the value of 
durable banking relationships (see James and Smith (2000) for a survey of this literature). Slovin, 
Sushka, and Polonchek (1993), Gibson (1995), Kang and Stulz (2000) pioneered the approach of 
examining the effects of bank distress announcements on client firm performance. Slovin, Sushka, 
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and Poloncheck (1993) report significantly negative wealth effect of Continental Illinois Bank’s de 
facto failure on client firms. However, these authors focus on only one bank, which limits the 
applicability of their results. Gibson (1995) and Kang and Stulz (2000), both using a sample of 
Japanese firms, present evidence that bank health affects firm performance, as reflected in the 
firm’s reduced investment and lower stock market valuation. As pointed out by Bae, Kang, and Lim 
(2002), however, the interpretation of their results, is complicated by the fact that the bank-firm 
relationship itself and bank health are not necessarily exogenous to firm performance. 
Recent work by Bae, Kang, and Lim (2002) and Ongena, Smith, and Michalsen (2003) is an 
important step forward in addressing the endogeneity issue. Both use the event-study approach and 
examine how exogenous shocks to banks affect the equity value of their client firms but find 
contrasting results. Bae, Kang, and Lim (2002) find that negative news announcements about the 
Korean banks, including the bankruptcy of a client firm, credit downgrading, deterioration of the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) ratio, etc., have negative effects on the value of their client 
firms. In contrast, Ongena, Smith, and Michalsen (2003) report that bank distress announcements 
had only small and temporary impacts on the equity value of Norwegian firms during the 
Norwegian banking crisis. In addition, Djankov, Jindra, and Klapper (2000) find announcements of 
bank closure have significantly negative effects on firms in Korea but not in Indonesia and 
Thailand. The advantage of the event-study approach is that, to the extent that the news 
announcements are unanticipated, it is possible to interpret the results from the event studies in a 
causal sense. The event-study approach, however, limits the scope of the analyses and does not 
provide evidence on the real impact of banking problems.  
Related to the first hypothesis of a lending channel, a strand of literature studies how 
liquidity shocks induced by changes in monetary policy affect bank lending activities, i.e., the 
“credit channel” (see Bernanke (1995) for a survey). Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Kashyap, 
Stein, and Wilcox (1993) present evidence that bank loan volumes decrease during monetary 
contractions. The latter two papers further document a rise in commercial paper issuance during 
such times. The main challenge is to identify the impact of a loan supply shock from 
contemporaneous loan demand-side shocks. Kashyap and Stein (2000) address this challenge by 
demonstrating that more liquid (large) banks are less likely to reduce lending during monetary 
contractions than are less liquid (small) banks. In a recent paper, Campello (2002) further exploits 
the differential responses of small banks with and without multi-bank holding company affiliations. 
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The evidence suggests that internal capital markets in bank holding companies weakens the impact 
of monetary policies on bank lending. 
Using aggregate data, some studies have examined whether a bank loan supply shock affects 
economic activity. The results are, again, not conclusive. Using data from the Great Depression, 
Bernanke (1983) and Calomiris and Mason (2003) find a significant impact of bank loan supply 
shock on real economic activities. Peek and Rosengren (2000) document the negative effect of the 
Japanese bank crisis on construction activity in the United States in the 1990s. On the other hand, 
recent work by Driscoll (2003) and Ashcraft (2006) do not find significant evidence that bank 
failure / monetary contractions are followed a decline in output.  
Some of the inconsistencies in the previous research findings are probably related to the two 
endogeneity problems discussed in the introduction. This paper seeks to identify a source of 
exogenous shock to bank financial conditions and, exploiting disaggregate data at both the loan 
level and firm level, to examine the mechanism through which an adverse shock to bank health 
affects corporate investment and performance.  
 
1.2. Institutional Background and the Natural Experiment 
Land prices in Japan almost tripled in the second half of the 1980s. At its peak in 1990, the 
market value of all the land in Japan, according to several estimates, was four times the land value 
of the United States, which is 25 times Japan's size (Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito, 1997). The boom 
was followed by an equally sharp fall in the early 1990s. Between March 1990 and the end of 1993, 
the price of land dropped by almost one half. Meanwhile, stock prices in Japan experienced a 
similar pattern of boom and bust. 
Japanese banks had significant exposure to the land market. They actively lent to the real 
estate sector: at the end of 1989, real estate loans on average constituted 6.4% of the total assets (the 
median was 5.0%). Banks also held land directly: at the end of 1989, the market value of land as a 
percentage of total bank assets averaged 7.9% (the median was 4.8%). When the land value dropped 
by half, many of these real estate loans went bad and banks suffered significant capital losses on the 
land they held.3  
This shortage of liquidity was exacerbated by another development in the 1990s, that is, the 
tightening of capital requirements due to the introduction of the Basel Accord in 1993. During the 
rest of the 1990s, Japanese banks came under increasing pressure to meet the capital requirements. 
Although the interest rates were low in Japan in the 1990s, the tightening of capital requirements 
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means that, as long as capital market imperfections prevent banks from issuing equity, the capital 
losses in real estate will be translated into less loanable funds. 
Such a setting, along with a rich dataset of matched lending between banks and firms, 
provides an excellent laboratory to examine the transmission mechanism of a shock to banks. It 
helps to deal with the endogeneity problems commonly encountered in separating the effect of a 
loan supply from demand-side shocks, namely, the endogeneity of bank financial condition and 
endogenous selection of banking relationships. Regarding the endogeneity of bank health to firm 
performance, when land prices dropped by one half, banks were hurt proportionally to their 
exposure to the real estate sector immediately prior to the shock. Thus, the shock induced an 
exogenous variation in bank financial condition that is plausibly exogenous to firm performance. 
Regarding the endogenous selection of bank-firm relationships, since the real estate exposure is not 
an indication of bank quality ex ante, this setting mitigates the concern of selection of banking 
relationship by firms. More importantly, with a unique sample of matched lending between 
borrowers and lenders, I can examine whether the same firm borrowing from two different banks 
would obtain a smaller loan from the bank with more real estate exposure, which controls for the 
endogenous selection of banking relationships. 
One institutional factor that might affect my tests is the liberalization of the bond market in 
the 1990s. Before 1990, the public debt market was highly regulated and issuing firms had to meet 
strict accounting criteria. In November 1990, all the official restrictions were lifted. Therefore, it is 
possible that an observed relationship between banks’ real estate exposure and lending may not be 
due to the weakened financial conditions of banks but due to reduced demand for bank loans as 
firms rely more on bond financing. This concern, however, should not affect my loan-level lending 
tests because the matched bank-firm lending data allows one to fully control for (observable or 
unobservable) firm characteristics by examining how lending to the same firm changes when its 
banks’ real estate exposure varies.  
Access to the bond market may, however, affect the firm-level tests of investment behavior 
and stock returns. The public bond market may provide firms with an alternative source of 
financing to make up for the decline in bank loans, reducing the impact of the lending channel. On 
the other hand, if access to bond market means loosened banking relationships and if, during an 
economic downturn, the bond market is not as liquid and thus is not a viable alternative, access to 
the bond market may even lead to a more severe shortage of financing. Thus the impact of access to 
the bond market is not ex ante clear cut. As discussed later in the empirical analysis, probably 
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reflecting the two offsetting effects, access to the bond market does not have significant impact on 
in firm-level investment and stock returns.4 Moreover, controlling for bond-market access does not 
alter the main results about the lending channel. 
Overall, the collapse in the Japanese land market provides a unique setting to test both of the 
two hypotheses related to the transmission mechanism of a shock. In what follows, I first provide 
evidence on the credit constraints of banks based on the loan level data with matched borrowers and 
lenders. Then I provide evidence on the real impact of the shock using firm level data.   
 
II. Loan Level Evidence on the Effect of a Shock to Banks 
 
 In this section I test the first hypothesis on the transmission mechanism of a shock to banks, 
that is, banks are credit constrained. When they are hit by an exogenous shock, they can not find 
enough financing to make up for a shock-induced shortfall in funds. In the current setting, the 
testable hypothesis is that banks with greater exposure to the real estate sector become less healthy 
(or more liquidity constrained) and therefore are more likely to reduce lending after the shock.  
 
2.1 Empirical Methodology 
To identify how banks’ financial condition affects bank lending, I first need an exogenous 
measure of banks’ financial condition. As discussed earlier, when land prices dropped by half 
between 1990 and 1993, an exogenous shock to any individual bank, banks suffered varying 
degrees of capital losses according to their pre-shock exposure to the real estate sector. Thus the 
banks’ pre-shock real estate exposure serves as an exogenous measure of a bank’s financial 
condition.  
Then if firms are randomly assigned to banks, the analysis would be straightforward. I could 
simply focus on lending behavior of banks with and without much real estate exposure. The 
difference between the two groups can be attributed to the effect of bank financial condition 
induced by the land-price collapse. However, firms are not randomly assigned to banks. One can 
easily construct examples where endogenous selection of banking relationships might drive an 
observed relationship between the bank’s financial condition and firm performance. One such 
example is that “bad” firms (e.g., those with less investment opportunities) choose to borrow from 
weak banks to avoid monitoring and discipline. Both these “bad” firms and weak banks are more 
 8
vulnerable to external economic shock, leading to a spurious relationship between bank financial 
condition and firm performance.  
In general, an important challenge in separating the effect of a bank loan supply shock is to 
control for unobserved firm characteristics that might affect loan demand. For example, the same 
shocks that trigger banking problems may also cause a decline in the investment opportunity of 
firms and thus the demand for credit by firms. In addition, the adverse shock might hurt the balance 
sheets of borrowers and their credit worthiness, which leads to reduced lending. If firms more 
affected by the adverse shock somehow are selected into banks with more real estate exposure, one 
would observe a spurious relationship between shocks to a bank’s financial condition and firm 
performance.  
My empirical strategy is to employ a rich data set of matched lending between lenders and 
borrowers, which allows one to exploit the fact that there are firms that borrow from multiple banks. 
Using these firms, I can examine whether the same firm received less financing from the unhealthy 
bank and more from the healthy bank. In a regression framework, the idea is to fully control for the 
firm characteristics (both observable and unobservable) through the firm fixed effects and therefore 
isolate the effect of a shock to a bank’s financial condition on lending. Specifically, I estimate the 
following model: 
 
,  (1)       ij i i ij jLending a b RE Exposure c Bank controls d Relationship characteristics u= + + + +
 
where subscript i indexes the banks; j indexes the firms; and uj is the firm fixed effects. 
The dependent variable, Lendingij, is a measure of lending from bank i to firm j between 
1994 and 1998. The availability of credit is measured using the log of loan growth defined as a 
firm's average long-term borrowing from a particular bank between 1994 and 1998 normalized by 
the average long-term borrowing from the same bank during the five years prior to the shock 
(between 1984 and 1989). This focus on long-term lending is because, as pointed out by Hibara 
(2001), long-term loans are mainly associated with financing of Japanese corporate fixed 
investment. Since it is difficult to know how long it takes for the real estate losses to show up in 
lending, I examine the average lending five years after the shock. The bank control variables, which 
will be introduced shortly, are also averaged across years.  
Using the amount of borrowing to measure credit availability implicitly assumes that the 
amount of debt used is the amount of credit available to the firm. This assumption is defensible for 
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two reasons. First, after the collapse of stock and land prices, banks, facing mounting non-
performing loans, had to tighten credit. On the borrower’s side, as most bank loans were backed by 
land as collateral, the collapse in land prices significantly reduced the firms’ ability to collateralize, 
resulting in tighter credit constraints. The contractual features of long-term loans necessarily mean 
that the loan balances adjust more slowly than desired by the lender. Therefore, after loan demand is 
controlled for, a large loan balance can arise both from the lender's willingness to lend and from 
lending decisions in the past. Normalizing loan balances by the amount borrowed in the earlier 
years helps separate out the effect of prior lending decisions. 
RE Exposure is the bank’s exposure to the real estate sector, which is used to measure 
banks’ financial condition. It includes two variables. The first is the bank’s real estate loans as a 
percentage of its total assets, measured in 1989, the year prior to the shock (% Real Estate Loans). 
The other is the market value of land the bank held at the end of 1989 as a percentage of its total 
assets (% Land Holding). As only the book value of land is available, I follow Hayashi and Inoue 
(1991) and use perpetual inventory method to construct the market value of land.5 The coefficient d 
captures the effect of the shock to a bank’s financial condition on lending and is expected to be 
negative. 
Bank control variables are fairly standard, including bank size, Tobin’s q, and liquid assets 
over total assets. Bank size is measured as the natural log of total assets. Tobin’s q, defined as the 
market-to-book value of the asset, measures a bank’s market power or franchise value. The effect of 
Tobin’s q on lending, however, is ex ante unclear. On one hand, to the extent that Tobin’s q reflects 
future investment opportunity, it should be related to more lending. On the other hand, franchise 
value has been shown to be (negatively) related to banks’ incentive to take risk. This is because, 
with deposit insurance (implicit or explicit), bank owners tend to take excessive risk as their payoff 
resembles a call option whose value increases with the risk (Keeley (1990) and Gan (2004)). 
Franchise value is something banks would lose in case of failure and thus constrains risk taking. To 
the extent that lending represents risks, higher franchise value would be associated to less lending, 
as is found in the U.S. data by Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan (1996). 
The liquidity of the bank’s balance sheet is measured as liquid assets over total assets. 
Kashyap and Stein (2000) find that banks with more liquid assets are less likely to reduce lending 
during monetary contractions. Liquid assets, however, can also lead to less lending, for two reasons. 
The first is related to the risk-shifting incentive discussed above. To the extent cash reflects past 
profitability and may predict future profitability (i.e., franchise value), banks with more cash may 
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be more conservative in lending. The second reason is related to precautionary saving. Dasgupta 
and Sengupta (2004) show that, in a multi-period setting, if firms anticipate being credit constrained 
in the future, an increase in liquid balances may make them more conservative in investment 
choices. Empirically, Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) find that firms tend to save more 
during recessions. Thus the effect of liquid assets on lending is ex ante ambiguous. 
I include in the regressions a set of variables reflecting the strength of the lending 
relationship in the ten years (1984-1993) prior to my sample period. The first dimension of the 
relationship is its duration. This should be a proxy for the private information the lender has about 
the firm. Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995) demonstrate explicitly that firms 
with long-term relationships with banks receive more credit from these banks and pay lower interest 
rates on loan commitments.  
My second measure of the strength of the relationship is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the bank was the firm's biggest lender at least once from 1984 to 1993. Sharpe (1990) and 
Rajan (1992) point out that relationship banking also increases the lender's information monopoly 
and creates “hold-up” costs and that firms can avoid these hold-up costs by establishing 
relationships with another bank. Japanese firms borrow from multiple banks. During the ten-year 
period between 1984 and 1993 prior to the sample period, Japanese firms borrowed from 16 banks 
on average with a median of 14 banks. Japanese firms, however, did not spread their borrowing 
evenly across all banks. They on average borrowed about one-third from a single institution. Even 
firms with over 10 lenders concentrated about 20% (the mean is 22% and the median is 20%) of 
their borrowing with their largest lenders. Therefore, whether or not the bank is the largest lender 
signifies how close the firm is to the bank. 
Another way to mitigate the “hold-up” problem and to ensure bilateral commitment between 
the lender and the borrower is for the lender to take an equity stake that allows sharing of future 
surpluses with the borrower, which is a common practice of Japanese banks. Therefore, the third 
dimension of the relationship is the percentage of equity stake that the bank has in the firm. Lastly, 
the institutional setting in Japan suggests that main banks obtain additional information on the 
group-affiliated firms. Therefore, I include a dummy variable indicating whether the bank is the 
firm's main bank. 
In my sample, of all the firm-bank pairs in 1989, about 35% did not have a lending 
relationship during the after-shock period between 1994 and 1998. To correct for potential 
survivorship bias, I estimate a selection model using Heckman's (1979) two-stage regression 
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technique. The first stage is a probit regression on whether the relationship survived; the second 
stage is an ordinary-least-squares regression on the log of loan growth. To the extent that the credit 
allocation is a two-step process in which the bank first makes a decision as to whether or not to lend 
and then makes a decision as to how much to lend, the selection model provides insight to both 
decisions. In addition, the bank characteristics prior to the shock is more likely to affect the first 
lending / no-lending decision whereas the contemporaneous bank characteristics tend to affect the 
second decision more. Therefore, in the first-stage regression, bank controls are measured in 1989, 
which naturally serve as instruments to help identify the second-stage regression. In all estimations, 
I report White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The results are robust to the GLS 
estimation with bank random effects accounting for dependence of the error terms due to the 
unobserved effect at the bank level.6
 
2.2 Data 
The main data source is Development Bank of Japan (DBJ) database, which contains long-
term lending from individual banks to manufacturing firms (Development Bank of Japan Industry 
Code 1000-1700) and financial information of these manufacturing firms. The data cover all 
publicly-traded manufacturing firms and their banks. Financial data on banks is from the NIKKEI 
NEEDs database. I identify each firm’s main bank using Industrial Groupings in Japan: the 
Anatomy of Keiretsu by Dodwell Marketing Consultants.7 Panels A and B of Table 1 present the 
summary statistics of the relationship-related variables and bank control variables used in the loan-
level analysis. 
It is worth noting that my sample does not include real estate firms, whose demand for loans 
is directly affected by the shock from the real estate market. Moreover, it has been reported that 
Japanese banks “ever-green” their loans by lending to weak firms, many of them real estate firms, 
to prevent their loans to go bad (e.g., Hoshi and Kashyap, 2004; and Peek and Rosengren, 2005). 
Consistent with this argument, lending to the real estate sector steadily increased from the early 
1990s till 1998. Therefore, excluding real estate firms increase the power of the tests.8
 
2.3 Empirical Results 
 Column (1a) of Table 2 reports the first-stage probit regression results. The dependent 
variable equals one if the relationship continues after the shock and zero otherwise. The 
independent variables are measured at the end of 1989. Relationship variables are important in 
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determining the change in loan renewals. Duration, being the largest lender to the firm, and being 
the main bank of the firm all increase the chance of loan renewal significantly (at the 1% or 5% 
level). As expected, the bank’s real estate exposure prior to the shock has a significantly negative 
effect on loan growth: the coefficients on both % Real Estate Loans and % Land Holding are 
significantly negative at the 1% level. Probably reflecting the two opposing effects of Tobin’s q, its 
coefficient is insignificant. 
Column (1b) of Table 2 reports results from the second-stage OLS regression, which is 
estimated based on the subgroup of firm-bank observations that have continued lending 
relationships. Among the relationship variables, being the biggest lender and being the main bank 
are related to more financing (at the 1% or 5% level). The coefficient of duration, however, is 
significantly negative. This could be reflecting that some of the loans granted earlier have been paid 
back. Compared to its effect on the loan renewal decision, a bank’s real estate exposure has a 
somewhat weaker impact on the actual credit allocation. While the coefficient on % Real Estate 
Loans is significant at the 1% level, the coefficient on % Land Holding is insignificant. The 
difference between these two exposures to the real estate sector is probably due to the fact that when 
real estate loans go bad they have a direct impact on the available funds, whereas land holdings, to 
the extent that they are not marketed to market, is more of a paper loss. The coefficient on liquid 
assets is significantly negative, which is consistent with the risk-shifting and the precautionary-
saving incentives discussed earlier. Note that this result is in contrast to the findings in Kashyap and 
Stein (2000) that liquid assets weaken the effect of monetary contractions. Thus, while a more 
liquid balance sheet can buffer small loan supply shocks (e.g., due to changes in monetary policy), 
the role of liquidity is more complicated when the bank is hit by a large shock.9
 In columns (2a) and (2b) of Table 2, I further explore how the banks’ capital positions affect 
lending. In particular, if a bank is well capitalized, the impact of losses from its real estate exposure 
should have a smaller effect on loan growth. Therefore, a dummy variable (BIND) is created that 
indicates if the bank’s capital ratio in 1989 was below the 4% capital requirement and let it interact 
with the two real-estate-exposure variables.10 In the selection equation in column (2a), although the 
capital ratio itself is not significant in explaining loan renewal, the interaction between the BIND 
dummy and % Real Estate Loans is significantly negative at the 10% level. In column (2b), the 
coefficient on the capital ratio is significantly positive (at the 5% level); the coefficients on the 
interaction terms are not significant. Other coefficients on the bank’s real estate exposure remain 
qualitatively unchanged. 
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 2.4 Robustness: The Effect of Bank Specialization 
 An alternative interpretation of the above results is related to bank specialization.11 Suppose 
firms have different types of loans served by different banks. For example, a firm may use Bank 1 
for its real estate-related loans and Bank 2 for, say, capital expenditure. Then with a fall in the real 
estate market and thus real estate-related activity, there is less demand for real estate loans, leading 
to reduced lending by Bank 1 with more observed “real estate exposure.”  
This argument is particularly relevant for real estate firms, since their demand for credit is 
closely tied to the real estate market. This concern, however, is greatly mitigated by the fact that the 
sample contains only manufacturing firms, not real estate firms. For manufacturing firms, real estate 
is an input into the production process (e.g., plants and structures) and should mostly be part of their 
fixed investments. Thus even if firms fund their real estate from one particular bank, as long as real 
estate borrowing is proportional to the total borrowing, the change in demand for loans from this 
“real estate bank” will not differ from other banks. 
The concern about specialized real estate lending is further mitigated by the fact that the 
Japanese banks are large and therefore less likely to be specialized (which is typical of a “bank-
centered” economy.) During the sample period, their average size is, if converted to U.S. dollars, 
approximately 80 billion. The smallest bank in the sample has assets of approximately 1 billion U.S. 
dollars. The Japanese banks are required to report their loans to different sectors (e.g., 
manufacturing loans, real estate loans, loans to individuals, etc.) I thus calculate the concentration 
ratio of the largest loan category, defined as the loan amount in the largest category as a percentage 
of total loans. The maximum concentration ratio is slightly above two-thirds (36%), with the 90 
percentile concentration ratio being slightly above a quarter (28%). Moreover, only 8% of banks 
have real estate loans as the largest category and among these banks, the real estate loans, on 
average, account for 25% of total lending. Therefore, it is unlikely that small and specialized real 
estate banks are driving the results. 
The following test was performed to further confirm the robustness of the results. If 
specialized real estate lending to the industrial firms - not bank financial condition - is driving the 
results, then, if a subset of banking relationships could be identified that are not likely to be driven 
by specialized real estate lending, the earlier results would not hold for these relationships. One 
such relationship is that between a firm and its top lender. As discussed earlier, Japanese firms 
source one-third of their borrowing from the top lender. Since real estate activities unrelated to 
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fixed capital expenditure must be a small proportion of their overall borrowing, borrowing from the 
top lender should not be specialized real estate loans. To implement this test, I create an interaction 
term between the dummy for top lenders and the lender’s real estate exposure. If the specialized real 
estate lending hypothesis is true, one would expect the coefficient on the interaction term to be 
positive so that the sum of the coefficients of real estate exposure and the interaction term is not 
significantly negative. The results are displayed in columns (2c) of Table 2. The coefficient of the 
interaction term is not positive, indicating that specialized real estate lending does not explain the 
earlier results about the effect of bank financial condition. Interestingly, the interaction term is 
significantly negative, implying that, although the top lenders generally lend more, the marginal 
benefit firms get from their top lenders decreases as the top lenders have more real estate exposure 
and therefore become financially less healthy. This result therefore strengthens the basic finding 
that banks’ financial conditions matter. 
 While bank specialization per se does not seem to affect the tests, one may be concerned 
with some pre-sorting of lending relationships that cannot be completely controlled for by firm 
fixed effects. For example, some banks may have a comparative advantage in funding certain types 
of loans within industrial loans, e.g., operating funds as opposed to non-operating funds (equipment 
funds). If this type of loan is somehow “out of favor” after the shock and if this less favored loan 
type is somehow related to banks’ real estate exposure, the earlier results could be driven by a 
systematic switch of loan types rather than by a bank’s financial condition. Although it is not 
obvious why for large and unspecialized banks, their engagement in certain industrial loan types are 
systematically related to their lending to the real estate sector or their land holding, it is worthwhile 
to check for robustness if relevant data are available. Japanese banks report their lending as 
operating funds versus non-operating (equipment) funds. As a robustness check, the percentage of 
operating funds prior to the shock (a bank level variable) is included in the estimation. The results 
are reported in column (2d) of Table 2.12 It turns out that operating funds have a negative impact on 
overall lending. This suggests that, when faced with tighter credit, firms economize on their 
operating funds (e.g., by cutting down on general office expense or advertising spending) before 
curtailing investment in productive capacity. The coefficients on the real estate exposure remain 
unchanged, implying that, while the shock might affect the loan demand mix, this phenomenon in 
itself does not drive the observed effect of a bank’s financial condition. 
 
2.5 Discussions: The Impact of the Contemporaneous Stock Market Collapse 
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While it is prohibited in some countries, in Japan, banks typically hold equity in their client 
firms. It is possible that bank losses in security holdings lead to worsened financial conditions in a 
similar way as their real estate exposure. Therefore, to gain a complete picture of the real effects of 
asset market bubbles, I explore the impact of the bank’s stock market exposure. 
There are, however, several factors that make it unclear how banks’ equity holdings might 
matter empirically. First, as market value accounting is only a recent concept, the “paper losses” 
from equity holdings may not affect bank liquidity and capital position. Second, banks’ equity 
holdings are typically long -- many equity stakes were purchased as early as the 1950s (Hoshi and 
Kashyap (2001)). With historical cost accounting, the holding period return is not negative even 
with the bursting of the bubble.13 In such cases, banks may sell their stock holdings in an effort to 
strengthen their capital positions, since the capital gain can count as capital under “revaluation 
reserves” in the Basle Accord capital requirements. Third, while equity holdings represent the 
bank’s stock market exposure, it may also measure the strength of its client relationships, especially 
with its larger clients. In identifying the real impact at the firm level, I focus on the firm’s most 
important lending relationship -- the one with its top lenders. Thus my ability to identify a real 
impact depends critically on how banks cut back lending across firms. For example, if banks cut 
back lending in equal yen amounts across firms, I may not be able to detect a real impact since there 
is not enough cross-firm variation in reduction of loans and thus investments.14 This is all the more 
likely to happen when loan cutbacks are due to losses in banks’ equity holdings: banks with larger 
equity holdings may be more protective of their large and more dependent borrowers, resulting in 
an seemingly insignificant real impact on firms. Lastly, empirically quantifying this effect is made 
difficult by the fact that only the book value of share holdings is reported, which is a noisy measure 
of banks’ losses in the stock market.  
In columns (3a) and (3c) of Table 2, I add as an independent variable is added for the bank’s 
stock market exposure, measured as its equity holding as a percentage of total assets prior to the 
shock in 1989 (% Stock Holdings). I also control for whether the bank sold their equity holdings 
between 1989 and 1993 (SOLD). While the bank’s equity holdings do not significantly affect the 
decision to renew loans, they are associated with significantly less lending overall (at the 1% level). 
The coefficient on the SOLD dummy is statistically insignificant. This is probably because banks 
may have sold their equity holdings for different reasons. On the one hand, banks might sell 
because they are desperate to come up with capital to meet the regulatory requirements, in which 
case SOLD is likely to be related to more cutbacks in lending. On the other hand, banks might have 
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accumulated a larger capital gain, which makes selling a cheaper alternative to other ways of raising 
capital, in which case SOLD should be related to a smaller reduction in lending. Interestingly, the 
coefficient on bank’s land holding now becomes significantly negative. This appears to be related to 
the fact that banks with greater land holding are more likely to sell their equity holdings to make up 
for the capital loss, reducing the impact of the bank’s land holding in the earlier estimation. Indeed, 
those banks that sold their equity holdings on average have land holding of 25%, as compared to the 
6% land holding among those that did not sell. 
 
 In sum, the banks’ real estate exposure prior to the shock negatively affects lending in two 
important ways: it not only lowers the chance of loans being renewed but also reduces the amount 
of credit actually being granted. A question naturally arises: does such reduction in loans affect the 
client firms’ investment behavior? This issue, as well as the real impact of the bank’s stock market 
exposure, is examined in the next section. 
 
III. Firm-Level Evidence on the Effect of a Shock to Banks 
 
With firm-level data, this section examines the second hypothesis related to the transmission 
of the shock to banks, that is, reduced lending results in less fixed investment and worse firm 
performance. As discussed earlier, Japanese firms borrow close to one-third of their loans from their 
largest lenders. When the top lender is hit by the real estate shock, if the firm can not substitute 
other sources of financing for funds that are previously provided by the top lender, the firm would 
have to cut back its investment. To the extent that firms have to pass by positive-NPV projects, their 
market valuation will be lowered. Therefore, in what follows, I investigate whether the pre-shock 
real estate exposure of the firm’s top lender is related to the firm’s fixed investment and stock 
market returns in the period subsequent to the land-price collapse. 
3.1. Top Lender’s Real Estate Exposure and Firm Investment 
3.1.1 Empirical Specification 
To examine whether the top lender’s real estate exposure negatively affects the firm’s ability 
to invest, I estimate the following baseline model: 
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The dependent variable, I/K, is measured as the average investment rate for the period 1994-
1998, reflecting, again, the fact that it is difficult to know how long it takes for the shock to take 
effect. Accordingly, the firm-level variables are also averaged across years unless otherwise 
specified. The main variables of concern are the top lender’s real estate exposure, measured as the 
real estate loans of the firm’s top lender ( ) and the top lender’s land 
holding (
% Re   Topal Estate Loans
%  TopLand Holding ). Since my loan-level analysis suggests that the bank’s capital position 
matters, I also control for the bank’s capital ratio in 1989. The coefficients d and e are expected to 
be negative. 
Firm controls include the usual set of variables in an investment equation: I have Tobin’s q 
to measure investment opportunity, the cash flow and the cash reserve normalized by the capital 
stock to measure internal liquidity, and industry dummies to control for industry-wide shocks. In a 
recent study, Gan (2006) finds that fixed investments by Japanese firms were negatively related to 
their land holding prior to the shock, a measure of collateral losses they suffered. I therefore control 
for the firm’s land holding in 1989, defined as market value of land normalized by the capital stock. 
I also control for the timing of the land purchase, measured by the proportion of land (in market 
value) purchased between 1988 and 1990, the period of rapid land price increase.  
Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) find that future growth and investment are negatively related 
to leverage, particularly for firms with high debt ratios. In the current setting, the effect of firms’ 
collateral losses may also depends on firm leverage, with highly leveraged firms investing less due 
to more binding borrowing constraints. I therefore control for leverage and also create a dummy 
variable indicating leverage above the median and let it interact with firm land holding. Panel C of 
Table 1 presents a summary of the variables used in the firm-level analysis. 
Regarding the estimation technique, note that the investment rate is right-skewed, with the 
median being about one-third of the mean.  When I estimate the investment equation using an 
ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression, I find that the distribution of the residual is still skewed, 
suggesting that the OLS estimators are not efficient. Therefore, I estimate the median or least 
absolute distance (LAD) regressions. LAD minimizes that sum of the absolute deviations rather the 
sum of the squared deviations. Therefore, it is less sensitive to the tail of the distribution or to 
outliers. Additionally, since for skewed data the median is generally a more efficient measure of the 
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center of the data than does the mean, the precision of the estimates will also increase.15 The 
standard errors are calculated based on the method suggested by Koenker and Bassett (1982). 
 
3.1.2 Data 
 The firm-level data mainly come from the tapes compiled by the Development Bank of 
Japan (DBJ). The DBJ database contains detailed accounting data on all non-financial firms listed 
on various stock exchanges from 1956 onwards. For investment analyses, the DBJ database has 
several advantages over the NIKKEI NEEDS database, a popular database used in Japanese 
economic studies. It provides a detailed breakdown of five depreciable capital goods, as well as 
asset-specific gross and current period depreciation, which together enable a more accurate 
calculation of the replacement cost of capital and the investment rate net of asset sale. This is why 
Japanese data have been used frequently in tests of investment models (e.g., Hayashi and Inoue 
1991). The stock market data are from the NIKKEI NEEDS database.  
The sample contains all manufacturing firms in the DBJ database for which stock market 
data are available for the period 1986-98 and information on the top lender’s real estate exposure is 
available for 1989. I drop from the analysis firms that do not have enough data to construct a 
capital-stock measure or have missing stock price data, firms that were involved in mergers and 
acquisitions between 1989 and 1998, and, if a firm changes its accounting period, the year in which 
such a change occurs. The Japanese fiscal year ends in March. However, many firms file late in the 
year. I follow the standard approach and define the fiscal year for a particular observation as the 
previous year if the firm filed before or in June, and as the current year if the firm files after June. 
The final sample contains 420 firms.16
 
3.1.3 Empirical Results 
Column (1) of Table 3 shows that the real estate exposure of the firm’s top lender, as 
measured by real estate loans, has a significantly negative impact on fixed investment (at the 5% 
level). The coefficient on land holding of the top lender is statistically insignificant. As is discussed 
below, however, the coefficient is significant for the less capitalized lenders. The top lender’s 
capital ratio prior to the shock is positively associated with the investment rate of the borrowing 
firm (at the 10% level), suggesting that all else equal, better capitalized banks are able to lend more.  
Consistent with Gan (2006), the firm’s land holding prior to the shock is related to a lower 
investment rate (significant at the 1% level). The coefficient on the interaction term between the 
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high leverage dummy and firm’s land holding is, as expected, significantly negative (at the 1% 
level). To the extent that land serves as collateral for corporate borrowing, the shock also worsens 
the borrower’s balance sheet position and thus their ability to borrow, especially when they are 
already high leverage. These results suggest a collateral channel a la Bernanke and Gertler (1990) 
and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and strengthen the argument that, in a test of the impact of the 
financial conditions of banks, it is important to control for the borrower’s “balance-sheet effect”. 
Lastly, the coefficient on leverage is significantly positive at the 10% level, probably because in a 
bank-dominated economy and at a time of severe credit rationing, how much firms can borrow also 
proxy for firm quality and/or lending relationships. However, leverage does hurt growth in the sense 
that it worsens the impact of collateral losses. 
In column (2) of Table 3, I control for firm’s access to alternative sources of debt financing, 
i.e., its access to the public bond markets. As pointed out by Hoshi and Kashyap (2001), after the 
liberalization of the bond market, Japanese firms need at least an investment grade (i.e., a rating 
equivalent to S&P's BBB rating or higher) to issue public debt. I code a dummy variable indicating 
whether or not a firm meets these criteria at least four years out of the five-year period during 1994-
1998 and include it in the estimation.17 Consistent with the earlier discussion that the effect of 
access to the bond markets is not ex ante clear-cut, the coefficient on access to the bond markets is 
not statistically significant. 
The impact of the top lender’s pre-shock exposure to the real estate sector may depend on 
how concentrated the firm’s borrowing is on this lender. The more the firm relies on its top lender, 
the more it will be hurt when this lender has to cut back lending. Therefore, in column (3) of Table 
3, I control for the concentration of borrowing from the top lender, defined as the top lender’s share 
in the firm’s total long-term loans outstanding. I also create a dummy variable indicating if the 
concentration is above the median and let it interact with the two measures of real estate exposure. 
Note that this specification also addresses a potential alternative explanation of the earlier results: if 
firms happen to concentrate their borrowings more on top lenders with greater real estate exposure, 
perhaps because these banks had more funds to spare in the late 1980s, the earlier findings may 
merely reflect such concentration in borrowing rather than the effect of the top lender’s real estate 
exposure. As shown in column (3) of Table 3, the concentration of loans from the top lender does 
have a negative impact on firm investments (at the 1% level). However, neither of the two 
interaction terms is significant and, by an F-test, I cannot reject the hypothesis that they are jointly 
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insignificant in explaining firm investment (p-value = 0.3115). On the other hand, the results on the 
real estate exposure remain unchanged. 
Next I examine how the effect of the top lenders’ real exposure depends on the bank’s 
capital position. In column (4) of Table 3, I create a dummy variable, BIND, indicating whether or 
not the bank had a capital ratio lower than the 4% requirement in 1989 and let it interact with the 
two measures of real estate exposure. The interaction term between the BIND dummy and the top 
lender’s land holding is significantly negative (at the 10% level), suggesting that the insignificant 
coefficient on % Land Holding earlier is driven by those better capitalized lenders. When the top 
lender is not well capitalized, its exposure due to direct land holding hurts a client firm’s ability to 
invest. On the other hand, the interaction term between the BIND dummy and % Real Estate Loans 
is not statistically significant, suggesting that the negative impact of exposure due to real estate 
lending does not vary significantly across lenders with different capital positions.18 The difference 
between the two coefficients on real estate exposures is similar to that in the loan-level tests, 
consistent with the earlier conjecture that losses from real estate loans dry up funds more directly 
and therefore are more related to the bank’s ability to grant loans. 
Lastly, I explore the real effect of the top lender’s stock market exposure. In column (5) of 
Table 3, I control, similar to Table 2, the top lender’s equity holdings (% Stock Holdings) and a 
dummy variable indicating whether the bank sold its equity holdings (SOLD). Neither of the two 
variables is statistically significant. Consistent with my earlier conjecture that equity holdings 
reflect the bank’s relationships with their clients, the bank seems to be reluctant to cut back loans to 
those who are dependent on them. To further explore this possibility, I include in the lending 
equation an interaction term between the top-lender dummy and the bank’s equity holdings, the 
coefficient is positive but not statistically significant (unreported). Thus, unlike the bank’s real 
estate exposure, a significant number of banks, when faced with stock market losses, tend to cut 
proportionally less loans to more dependent borrowers and thus squeeze smaller borrowers more. 
Therefore, even if there is a real impact of the lending shock, such an impact is hard to be detected 
across firms. Another reason for the insignificant stock market effect may simply be that the book 
value of equity holding is a noisy indicator of the bank’s true stock market exposure and thus 
reduces the statistically power of my tests. These difficulties further highlight the advantage of 
focusing on the bank liquidity shock arising from the burst of real estate bubble. 
Hayashi and Prescott (2002) argue that Japanese firms do not seem to be financially 
constrained as they hold much more cash than the U.S. firms and small firms have steadily 
 21
increased their cash holding since 1996. They point out a slowdown in total factor productivity 
growth as the main reason for Japan’s “lost decade of growth.” Cash holding, however, is 
endogenous. Recent empirical evidence that financially constrained firms save a bigger fraction of 
their cash balances in recessions is supportive of this view (Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 
2004).  The results in this paper, however, are not inconsistent with Hayashi and Prescott’s view. As 
the shock worsens the financial condition of the banking sector and therefore reduces their ability to 
lend, to the extent that firms have to cut back on investment in technologies that improves 
productivity, the total factor productivity in the economy would be reduced.  
The literature on the role of banks suggests that a liquidity shock to the banking sector 
causes firms to underinvestment. However, in the current setting, it is possible that firms took 
advantage of the increased collateral value due to the land price run-up in the 1980s to borrow 
excessively and wasted the funds on unprofitable projects. The reduced investments after the 
collapse simply represent a correction to the overinvestment problem. Although this hypothesis may 
change the interpretation of the results, it does not refute the effect of declined financial health of 
banks on firm investments. Nevertheless, this issue is important because it relates to our 
understanding of macroeconomic impact of bank health. I distinguish between these two hypotheses 
by examining the firms’ stock market valuation. To the extent that firms under-invest and pass up 
profitable investment projects, their stock market valuation should be lowered.  
3.2. Top Lender’s Real Estate Exposure and Firm Value 
3.2.1. Empirical Specification 
To examine whether the stock market valuation of firms is negatively related to their top 
lenders’ real estate prior to the shock, I estimate the following model: 
 
 % e    %     ,Top Topj j jRET a b R al Estate Loans c Land Holding d Firm Controls j jε= + + + +       (3) 
 
where the dependent variable is the buy-and-hold return for the period 1994-98 (RET). The main 
variables of concern are the top lender’s real estate exposure: the top lender’s real estate loans 
( % Re   Topjal Estate Loans ) and the land holding of the firm’s top lender ( %  
Top
jLand Holding ). The 
coefficients b and c are expected to be negative. Similar to Table 3, I control for the bank’s capital 
ratio in 1989. 
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In estimating Equation (3), I consider, in addition to the effect of bank financial condition, 
several non-mutually exclusive hypotheses similar to those in Kang and Stulz (2000) that may 
explain the cross-sectional returns for the period subsequent to the land-price collapse. The first is a 
“bubble-size” explanation, which implies that firms that enjoyed the boom during 1986-89 had a 
larger bubble in its valuation and would perform worse later.19  Therefore, I include the return 
during 1986-89 as a control variable (RET8689). To further distinguish this hypothesis from the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), I also control for the beta (BETA8689), which is calculated 
from the monthly return during 1986-89.20 Another explanation is that, concurrent with the shock to 
land price, there is a shock to the profitability of projects undertaken in the second half of the 1980s 
so that these projects ceased to be profitable. Therefore, I control for a forecast of cash flow, using 
the cumulative cash flow during 1986-89 divided by the firm’s total assets. According to this 
hypothesis, the coefficient on this variable should be negative. 
Similar to the investment equation, I control for the firm’s land holding prior to the shock 
(Land/K1989) and the timing of land purchases (% Recent Purchase). I also control for two valuation 
variables observed in 1989, namely, the price-earnings ratio and the book-to-market ratio. Lastly, as 
the dependent variable is the equity return, which is a function of leverage for any given return on 
assets, I control for leverage at the beginning of the sample period in 1993. Panel C of Table 1 
presents a summary of the variables used in the analysis. 
 
3.2.2. Empirical Results 
As shown in Table 1 (Panel C), between 1994 and 1998, the sample of firms experienced an 
average loss in equity value of 26% and a median loss in value of 34%. Column (1) of Table 4 
shows that the firm value is negatively related to the top lender’s land holding (significant at the 5% 
level). The coefficient on real estate loans is not statistically significant. However, as is discussed 
later, this is related to the capital position of the bank. Supportive of the bubble-size hypothesis, 
column (1) of Table 4 shows that the greater the gain prior to the shock between 1986 and 1989, the 
greater the fall in the post-shock period. Leverage is significantly positive, probably suggesting that 
firms that can secure borrowing are better firms and/or those with better relationships. Consistent 
with the earlier finding that firms with land holdings prior to the shock suffered greater losses of 
collateral and therefore faced greater credit constraints, the coefficient on the firm’s land holding in 
1989 is significantly negative (at the 10% level).  
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Column (2) of Table 4 includes some additional controls. As share prices fell more than the 
fundamentals, firms with more security holdings are expected to lose more value to the extent that 
the security holdings are shares. I control for export sales because given the recession at home, 
firms that export more may have been less affected. I also control for firms’ access to the bond 
market. None of these additional controls is significant; the earlier results regarding the impact of 
the top lender’s real estate exposure remain unchanged.  
In column (3) of Table 4, I control for the firm’s concentration of borrowing from its top 
lender. Similar to the investment equation, the top lender’s loan share is negatively related to firm 
value. However, none of the two interaction terms is significant and they are jointly insignificant 
based on the F-test (p-value = 0.4952). In column (4) of Table 4, I further examine how the effect of 
real estate exposure may vary with the top lender’s capital position prior to the shock. The 
interaction term between the BIND dummy and the top lender’s real estate loans becomes negative 
and marginally significant at 10% by a one-sided test. Given that the predictions about the real 
estate exposure are one-sided, this finding indicates (albeit weakly) that although the market does 
not “penalize” a firm when its better capitalized top lender lends to the real estate sector, if its top 
lender is not well capitalized, the lender’s real estate lending hurts the firm’s valuation. On the other 
hand, results regarding the top lender’s land holding remain unchanged. The difference in the two 
measures of real estate exposure could be reflecting that land holding is more visible than lending to 
the real estate sector and the market valuation is thus more based on land holding.  
The impact of the stock market exposure is presented in column (5) of Table 4. Consistent 
with the results in Table 3, the stock market related variables are not statistically significant. This 
finding further supports the earlier argument that, given the data limitations, it is hard to empirically 
quantify the real impact of the bank’s stock market exposure.  
As a summary, the results in this section demonstrate that the real estate exposure of a firm’s 
top lender affects the firm’s ability to make fixed investments and reduces its stock valuation. These 
findings, combined with the earlier evidence at the loan level, suggest that a shock to the financial 
condition of the banking sector is transmitted to the real sector by reducing the bank’s ability to 
grant loans and the firm’s ability to invest profitable projects. Are these results economically 
significant? This question is examined in the next section. 
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IV. Economic Significance 
 
I compare the lending behavior of two hypothetical banks that are otherwise identical except 
that one has real estate exposure at the 25th percentile in both measures (% Real Estate Loans = 
3.6% and % Land Holding = 2.1%) and the other at the 75th percentile (% Real Estate Loans = 
7.9% and % Land Holding = 7.8%). Note that the coefficient estimates in column (1a) of Table 1 
reflect the marginal impact of change in real estate exposure on the probit index, not probability. 
Therefore I first calculate the marginal impact of real estate exposure on the probability of 
relationship continuation evaluated at the mean. They are -0.944 for % Real Estate Loans and -
0.879 for % Land Holding. Thus the probability of continued relationship is 4.1 percentage points 
(=-0.944*(7.9%-3.6%) lower for the 75th percentile bank due to its excess real estate loans and 5.0% 
percentage points (=-0.879*(7.8%-2.1%)) lower due to its excess land holding. These effects are 
moderate compared to the unconditional probability of relationship survival (65%). As to the 
overall impact of real estate exposure on the loan growth, from column (1b) of Table 2, the 75th 
percentile bank is expected to be have a growth rate over pre-shock level that is 9.2 percentage 
points (=-2.318*(7.9%-3.6%) lower than that is for the 25th bank. These magnitudes are clearly 
economically important. 
The estimates in Table 3 and 4 are also consistent with a significant effect of the lending 
shock on fixed investment and firm value. Let’s base the calculation on the differential behavior of 
two otherwise identical firms with top lenders’ real estate exposure at the 25th percentile and the 75th 
percentile. According to column (1) of Table 3, the firm with a top lender who held real estate loans 
at the 75th percentile would have an investment rate 2.6 percentage points lower than the other firm. 
If the top lenders face binding capital requirement, firm investment will be further reduced by 6.8 
percentage points due to the lender’s land holding. The stock market appears to have taken this into 
account: the firm with the top lender with 75th percentile exposure has a market valuation that is 8.6 
percentage points lower due to its lenders’ excessive land holding and in the case where the top 
lender is facing binding capital requirement, the market valuation is 5.2 percentage lower due to the 
lender’s excessive lending to the real estate sector. These effects are economically significant.  
The above calculations only compare banks at extremes of the spectrum of real estate 
exposure. To gauge the total impact of the shock, I integrate over the distribution of the real estate 
exposure. In particular, I take the actual real estate exposure measures and assume that for banks 
with these measures above the 25th percentile the credit constraints are binding. For example, to 
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obtain the aggregate impact of the shock on the loan growth, I take the estimate of -2.138 in column 
(1) of Table 2 (the most conservative estimate) and calculate an aggregate of the incremental impact 
of % Real Estate Loans above the 25th percentile across bank-firm pairs.21 It turns out the total loan 
growth is 3.5 percentage points lower than it would be if all banks were unconstrained. The total 
fixed investment is lowered by 1.1 percentage point due to banks’ real estate lending and 0.16 
percentile due to their land holding. Aggregate firm value is lowered by 2.8 percentage points due 
to banks’ land holding and by 0.7 percentage point due to banks’ real estate lending. During the 
sample period, firms in the sample lost 13.8% in total value. Thus the shock to banks accounts for 
about a quarter (25.2%) of such a loss. 
 It is worth noting that the results above are based on publicly traded banks and firms, which 
represent perhaps the most important component of the economy. For smaller and younger firms, 
the effect can be arguably even more pronounced as they are more affected by the information 
asymmetry in the credit market due to higher “information costs.” Therefore, the above economic 




 Exploiting a unique economic setting and a unique data set, this paper identifies and 
quantifies the full economic impact of a powerful lending channel that transmits downward 
movements in asset markets to the real economy. It provides two levels of evidence characterizing 
such a transmission mechanism. At the individual loan level, I find that banks are credit 
constrained: when they are hit by the shock in the land market, banks with greater real estate 
exposure prior to the shock have to cut back lending in the five years subsequent to the shock. At 
the individual firm level, I find that, consistent with the view that firms cannot easily substitute 
other sources of financing for bank credit, the borrowing firms’ behavior is significantly affected by 
their top lender’s real estate exposure: they invest less and lose market value. To my knowledge, 
this is the first paper providing large-sample loan-level evidence on the transmission of a banking 
shock to firms’ real (investment) decisions and market valuation. Moreover, it is also the first paper 
that is based on all publicly traded firms in an economy and thus quantifies the full economic 
impact of a loan supply shock. 
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While this paper emphasizes a strong lending channel that transmits an asset market bubble 
into the real economy, Gan (2006) documents another channel through which the real and financial 
sectors of the economy interact. That is, the burst of asset market bubbles is likely to impair 
collateral value and thus diminish firms’ to borrower to finance investment projects, because most 
bank loans are collateralized and land is an important form of collateral around the world. This 
collateral channel, together with the lending channel identified in this paper, points to two powerful 
ways by which asset market bubbles affect the real economy. 
Japan’s experience has important implications for the U.S. and other countries. Around the 
world, the property markets have enjoyed unprecedented price increases in recent years. As a result, 
banks have enjoyed large increases in real estate related lending business. There has been hot debate 
on what would happen to the economy if there were a “correction” in the property markets. The 
Japanese experience in the 1990s suggests that a decline in the property market may have a large 
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1 Researchers have used aggregate data to study the relationship between bank loan supply and 
economic activity. However, as will be reviewed later, the results are mixed. 
2 Hubbard, Kuttner, Palia (2002) study how banks’ health affect borrowers’ cost of fund, also using 
a matched sample of loans. My study differs from theirs in two aspects. First, their sample is 
restricted to syndicated loans. Second, they do not study the bank effects on firms’ investment 
behavior and stock market valuation. 
3 An indirect effect is that, as most of long-term bank loans in Japan are collateralized by land, the 
credit quality of bank loans thus deteriorated. 
4 It is also possible that this result simply reflects the fact that I control for other firm characteristics 
which may determine firms’ access to bond market. 
5 In the NIKKEI NEEDS database, which provides financial data on banks, the land areas owned 
are also available. Under the assumption that there is a homogenous unit price, it can be converted 
into the market value. However, the homogenous unit price assumption does not generally hold. For 
example, a piece of land in the central business district of Tokyo would be much more expensive 
than a parcel of equal size in the suburbs. The book value of land may better reflect its price and 
therefore its market value at the time of purchase. Moreover, NIKKEI NEEDS data results in less 
number of observations. Nevertheless, when I use the land area as an alternative measure of land 
holding, I obtain similar results. 
6 The results are actually stronger, which is not surprising as the GLS is more efficient than the OLS 
if the model is correctly specified (Hausman tests do not reject the exogeneity of the bank effects). 
For the sake of brevity, I do not report these results but they are available upon request. 
7 Some studies also use the classification of Keiretsu no Kenkyu published by the Keizai Chosa 
Kyokai (Economic Survey Association). Both Keiretsu no Kenkyu and Dodwell publications 
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classify Keiretsu firms based loan structure, bank shareholding, and historical factors. Dodwell's 
definition of group firms is narrower than Keiretsu no Kenkyu and are more stable over time. Using 
the Dodwell classification, less than 4% of the firms in the sample switch into or out of their groups 
over a 13-year period. As I already control for whether the bank is the largest lender and other time-
varying relationship variables, I prefer a classification that is more stable. In my sample, of all the 
largest lenders, 23% are main banks. 
8  The loan “ever-greening” explanation of the economic recession in Japan is not inconsistent with 
the lending channel. In fact, it is very likely that the “ever-greening” incentive at the banks 
exacerbates the real effects of the bank liquidity shock by reducing the amount of credit available to 
the manufacturing sector. Indeed, in a Bank of Japan (BOJ) Financial Institution Research Institute 
Report issued in 2000, the BOJ expressed the concern that, due to increased lending to the real 
estate sector after the burst of bubbles, banks imposed very tight credit to small and medium 
enterprises. For more details, see http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/japanese/kinyu/2000/kk19-4-5.pdf (in 
Japanese). 
9 One way to distinguish between the risk-shifting and the precautionary-saving incentives is to 
account for the effect of liquidity on banks with different capital positions. As pointed out by 
Keeley (1990), when banks have less capital at stake, they have little to lose and tend to be more 
aggressive in extending loans. On the other hand, a weak capital position increases the need for 
precautionary saving. Therefore, in a later estimation, I include as independent variable an 
interaction term between liquid assets and a dummy variable indicating whether the firm’s capital 
ratio in 1989 is below the 4% capital requirement. The results are supportive of the precautionary-
saving incentive: the interaction term is significantly negative (columns (3a) and (3b) in Table 2). 
The coefficient on the liquid assets itself is positive but insignificant. 
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10 Basel Accord, an international agreement on bank capital standards, was introduced in 1988. 
Although the main focus of the Accord is on risk-based capital requirements, it sets a core (basic) 
capital requirement of 4%. Given that the data on risk-based capital ratio is not available, I use the 
core requirement to measure whether the bank faces binding capital requirements. 
11 I thank Murillo Campello for pointing out this possibility to me. 
12 The additional control variables in columns (2c) and (2d), namely the interaction between the top-
lender dummy and real estate loans and the percent of operating funds are not statistically 
significant in the first-stage regression. Including them in the first-stage estimation does not change 
the results. 
13 One may think that a similar argument can be applied to banks’ land holdings. However, banks 
may have purchased land for speculative purposes or have obtained land through foreclosure. These 
land holdings are much more recent and use up cash, half of their value evaporated during the 
collapse. 
14 Under reasonable assumptions, a detectable real impact generally requires that the bank at least 
cut back lending proportionally (based on outstanding loans) across lenders.  
15 For an overview of LAD and quantile regressions in economics research, see Koenker and 
Hallock (2001). Koenker and Bassett (1978) show that the regression median is more efficient than 
the OLS estimator in a linear model for any distribution for which the median is more efficient than 
the mean in the location model. 
16 Note this sample shrinks from that in the lending equation mainly due to the requirements that (1) 
the lending relationships existed in 1989; (2) valid firm-level financial information in the DBJ 
financial database. I am not aware of any systematic pattern in the firms dropped. Indeed, the earlier 
results in Table 2 can be reproduced in this smaller set of firms (unreported but available upon 
request), further suggesting that the firm-level results are not driven by sample selection. 
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17 This is a relatively restrictive cutoff. As it takes time for firms to prepare for bond issuance, they 
may not be able to issue whenever they get an investment grade. However, alternative cutoffs of 
meeting the criteria once to five times do not change the results. 
18 The significance level of the interaction between land holding and the BIND dummy increases to 
5% when I drop this variable, suggesting that this term is adding noise to the estimation. Therefore I 
drop this variable in the later estimation. 
19 I thank the referee for suggesting this term to me. 
20 During 1986-89 when the market performed well, high beta stocks had better performance on 
average than did low beta stocks. When I regress RET9498 on RET8689, I am effectively 
regressing the return on the beta. If the beta is constant over time, one would expect high beta 
stocks to perform poorly, since the market performed poorly during 1994-98. 
21 This involves calculating the reduction in loan growth due to real estate loans for each bank-firm 
pair above the 25th percentile (dij = 2.138*(% Real Estate Loansi – 3.6%), where i indexes banks 
and j indexes firms) and then aggregating across bank-firm pairs (=log(∑Lije-di/∑Lij), where Lij is 
the loan balances prior to the shock between bank i and firm j). 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
Statistics Variable Names
Panel A: Banking Relationship Variables
Log (loan growth) Duration Top Lender Equity Stake (%) Main bank
Mean 0.432 6.85 0.174 3.123 0.077
Median 0.371 7 3.11
Panel B: Bank Level Variables
% Real Estate 
Loans % Land Holding Log(assets) Tobin's q




% Operating Funds 
(1989) % Stock Holdings SOLD
Mean 0.064 0.079 14.629 1.022 0.278 0.034 0.671 0.022 0.242
Median 0.05 0.048 14.481 1.017 0.258 0.033 0.67 0.019 0.000
Panel C: Firm Level Variables
  Variables used in the investment regressions:
I / K Tobin's q Cash Flow / K Cash Stock / K Land / K (firm)
% Recent 
Purchase Debt / Asssets
Top Lender's Loan 
Share (1989)
  Mean 0.306 0.87 0.084 0.187 0.677 0.018 0.171 0.364
  Median 0.086 0.716 0.019 0.165 0.691 0.004 0.164 0.303






Book to Market 
(1989) Beta
Bank Debt / 
Debt
flow 1986-89 / 
Assets
Security Holdings / 
Assets
  Mean -0.262 1.066 49.376 0.236 0.341 0.623 0.021 0.054
  Median -0.343 0.615 31.29 0.233 0.329 0.702 0.019 0.038
This table presents descriptive statistics on variables used in the paper. Panel A presents summary statistics for relationship variables. Log(loan growth) is the log of the average
borrowing from a particular bank during 1994-1998 normalized by the average borrowing from the same bank during 1984-1989. Duration is the number of years that the firm-
bank pair had positive loan balances in the past 10 years during 1984-1993. Top Lender is whether the bank served as the firm’s largest lender at least once during 1984-1993.
Equity Stake is the number of shares owned by the bank as a percentage of the firm's total shares outstanding in 1989. Main Bank is a dummy variable indicating whether the
bank is the firm's main bank. Panel B presents the statistics for banks. % Real Estate Loans are the loans to the real estate sector pver the total assets in 1989. % Land Holding is 
the market value of land over the total assets in 1989. q is Tobin's average q. Liquid Assets / Assets is the sum of cash and government security holdings over total assets.
Capital Ratio is the book equity over total assets. % Operating Funds is the operating funds as a percentage of total loans in 1989. % Stock Holdings is the equity holdings as a
percentage of total assets in 1989. SOLD is a dummy variable indicating whether the bank sold its equity holdings druing years 1989-1993. Panel C presents the statistics for
firms. I / K is the average investment rate defined as fixed investments normalized by the beginning-of-period capital stock between 1994 and 1998. q is Tobin's average q.
Cash Flow / K is cash flow normalized by normalized by the beginning-of-period capital stock. Cash Stock / K is the cash stock normalized by the beginning-of-period capital
stock at the end of 1993. Land/K (firm) is the firm's market value of land normalized by the replacement cost of capital in 1989. % Recent Purchase is the proportion of land (in
market value) purchased during 1988-1990. Top Lender's Loan Share is the firm's top lender's share of total long-term loans in 1989. Return (1994-1998) and Return (1986-
1989) are the buy-and-hold stock return during the years 1994-1998 and 1986-1989, respectively. Beta  is calculated using monthly return during 1989-1989. 
Table 2. Bank Real Estate Exposure and Lending
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3a) (3b)
Probit OLS Probit OLS OLS OLS OLS
Relationship Characteristics:
Duration 0.300*** -0.137*** 0.301*** -0.147*** -0.162*** 0.301*** -0.151***
(0.010)          (0.043)         (0.010)        (0.042)        (0.043)        (0.010)          (0.043)        
Top Lender 0.306*** 0.090** 0.310*** 0.292*** 0.255*** 0.309*** 0.285***
(0.043)          (0.039)         (0.043)        (0.077)        (0.078)        (0.043)          (0.078)        
Main Bank 0.156** 0.355*** 0.146** 0.335*** 0.346*** 0.148** 0.335***
(0.068)          (0.048)         (0.069)        (0.048)        (0.049)        (0.069)          (0.049)        
% Equity Stake -0.017 -0.015 -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 -0.017 -0.006
(0.013)          (0.012)         (0.013)        (0.012)        (0.012)        (0.013)          (0.013)        
Bank Characteristics:
Log (assets) 0.024 0.086*** 0.026 0.120*** 0.095*** 0.025           0.094***
(0.027)          (0.028)         (0.030)        (0.030)        (0.033)        -0.03 -0.033
Tobin's q 0.611 0.207 0.352 -0.455 0.204 0.284           0.169         
(0.517)          (0.638)         (0.560)        (0.731)        (0.818)        -0.558 -0.873
Liquid Assets / Assets 0.3 -0.531*** 0.29 -0.534** -0.983*** 0.214           0.940         
(0.226)          (0.189)         (0.240)        (0.214)        (0.310)        -0.254 -0.792
Capital Ratio 0.896 10.311** 11.986** 1.325           5.144         
(4.002)        (4.004)        (5.213)        -4.122 -5.411
% Operating Funds -0.515** -0.480*
(0.246)        -0.247
Liquid Assets / Assets * BIND -1.451**
-0.714
Bank Real Estate Exposure in 1989:
% Real Estate Loans -2.845*** -2.138*** -2.449*** -2.003** -1.845** -2.682*** -3.176**
(0.633)          (0.741)         (0.687)        (0.784)        (0.799)        (0.816)          (1.618)        
% Land Holding -2.649*** 0.91 -4.641** -0.006 -0.91 -4.515** -4.189*
(0.829)          (0.988)         (2.081)        (2.428)        (2.423)        (2.085)          (2.511)        
% Real Estate Loans * BIND -0.939* -0.318 0.243 -0.897 3.187
(0.584)        (0.651)        (0.744)        (0.601)          (2.034)        
% Land Holding * BIND 2.017 0.994 1.332 1.952 3.918
(1.753)        (2.248)        (2.299)        (1.750)          (2.411)        
Top-Lender Dummy * % Real Estate Loans -3.503*** -3.172*** -3.406***
(1.146)        (1.145)        (1.149)        
% Stock Holdings 0.931 -6.802***
(1.936)          (1.824)        
SOLD - Stock Holdings -0.085
(0.172)        
IMR 1.064*** 1.003*** 0.897*** 0.941***
(0.284)          (0.282)          (0.284)          (0.284)          
Observations 11393 7452 11393 7452 7452 11393 7452
Psuedo R2 / R2 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
This table presents the effect of the bank's real estate exposure prior to the land-price collapse on its lending to its client firms based on
Heckman two-stage regressions. The first stage is a probit regression. The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating the
survival of the lending relationship. The second stage is an OLS regression. The dependent variable is the log of average borrowing from
a particular bank during 1994-1998 normalized by average borrowing from the same bank during the years 1984-1989. Duration is the
number of years that the firm-bank pair had positive loan balances in the past 10 years during the years 1984-1993. Top-Lender is a
dummy indicating whether the bank served as the firms largest lender at least once during the years 1984-1993. Main Bank is a dummy
variable indicating whether the bank is the firm's main bank. % Equity Stake is the number of shares owned by the bank as a percentage
of the firm's total shares outstanding. q is Tobin's average q. Liquid Assets / Assets is the sum of cash and government security holdings
over total assets. Capital Ratio is the book equity over total assets in 1989. % Operating Funds is the operating funds as a percentage of
total loans in 1989. % Real Estate Loans are the loans to the real estate sector over total assets in 1989. % Land Holding is the market
value of land over total assets in 1989. BIND is a dummy variable indicating whether the top lender's capital ratio in 1989 is below the
capital requirement of 4%. % Stock Holdings is the equity holdings as a percentage of total assets in 1989. SOLD is a dummy variable
indicating whether the bank sold its equity holdings druing the years 1989-1993. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are
presented in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 3. Effect of the Top Lender's Real Estate Exposure on the Firm's Fixed Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
q 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.026***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash Flow / K 1.111*** 1.116*** 1.107*** 1.103*** 1.083***
(0.018)                 (0.022)                 (0.021)                 (0.022)                 -0.016
Cash Stock / K 0.205*** 0.204*** 0.205*** 0.206*** 0.209***
(0.003)                 (0.003)                 (0.003)                 (0.003)                 -0.002
Land / K 1989 (firm) -0.132*** -0.138*** -0.173*** -0.173*** -0.168***
(0.036)                 (0.044)                 (0.043)                 (0.044)                 -0.031
% Recent Purchase -0.064 -0.07 -0.042 -0.027 -0.024
(0.118)                 (0.145)                 (0.111)                 (0.109)                 -0.08
Leverage 0.090* 0.116* 0.140** 0.157** 0.154***
(0.054)                 (0.067)                 (0.069)                 (0.068)                 (0.049)             
Land / K 1989 (firm) * High Leverage -0.092*** -0.097*** -0.118*** -0.107*** -0.117***
(0.018)                 (0.022)                 (0.022)                 (0.023)                 (0.016)             
Access to the Public Bond Market -0.014 (0.004)                 
(0.014)                 (0.013)                 
Top Lender's Real Estate Exposure and Other Characteristics in 1989:
% Real Estate Loans -0.615** -0.509* -0.664** -0.640* -0.712***
(0.249)                 (0.305)                 (0.309)                 (0.369)                 (0.265)             
% Land Holding -0.07 -0.134 -0.484 0.001 -0.009
(0.292)                 (0.352)                 (0.482)                 -0.514 (0.372)             
Top Lender's Capital Ratio 2.520* 2.218 2.811 5.654** 5.320***
(1.419)                 (1.694)                 (1.738)                 (2.343)                 (1.379)             
Top Lender's Loan Share -0.123*** -0.100*** -0.114***
(0.037)                 -0.029 (0.021)             
% Real Estate Loans * CON 0.075
(0.132)                 
% Land Holding * CON 0.487
(0.705)                 
% Real Estate Loans * BIND -0.044
(0.145)                 
% Land Holding * BIND -1.189* -1.113**
(0.693)                 (0.557)             
% Stock Holdings 0.075
(0.702)             
SOLD - Stock Holdings 0.07
(0.062)             
Observations 420 420 420 420 420
Psuedo R2 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.45
This table presents the effect of the top lender's real estate exposure on firm investment based on Least Absolute Distance (LAD)
Regressions. The dependent variable I / K is the average investment rate (defined as fixed investments normalized by the beginning-
of-period capital stock) between 1994 and 1998. Cash flow / K is the cash flow normalized by normalized by the beginning-of-period
capital stock. Cash Stock / K is the cash stock normalized by the beginning-of-period capital stock at the end of 1993. q is Tobin's
average q, Land / K (firm) is the firm's market value of land normalized by the replacement cost of capital in 1989. % Recent
Purchase is the proportion of land (in market value) purchased during 1988-1990. Leverage is the debt to assets ratio. High Leverage
is a dummy variable indicating a firm's leverage above the median. % Real Estate Loans is the loans to the real estate sector
normalized by the total assets in 1989. % Land Holding is market value of land normalized by the total assets in 1989 for the top
lender. CON is a dummy variable indicating whether the top lender's loan share is above the median. BIND is a dummy variable
indicating whether the top lender's capital ratio in 1989 is below the capital requirement 4%. Standard errors are calculated based on
the asymptotic variance. They are presented in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and
*, respectively.
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Table 4. The Top Lender's Real Estate Exposure and Firm Valuation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Return (1986-89) -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.041*** -0.041***
(0.011)                 (0.012)                (0.012)                (0.011)                 -0.011
Beta 0.046 0.048 0.041 0.042 0.042
(0.036)                 (0.037)                (0.037)                (0.037)                 -0.037
Cash Flow (1986-89) / Assets 0.364 1.495* 1.606** 1.553* 1.554*
(0.497)                 (0.789)                (0.816)                (0.831)                 -0.832
Leverage (1993) 0.441*** 0.404** 0.361* 0.399** 0.400**
(0.170)                 (0.185)                (0.185)                (0.178)                 -0.178
Bank Debt / Total Debt (1993) 0.085* 0.065 0.058 0.076 0.076
(0.050)                 (0.053)                (0.054)                (0.053)                 -0.053
Price Earnings Ratio (1989) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Book to Market (1989) 0.007*** 0.005* 0.006* 0.006** 0.006**
(0.003)                 (0.003)                (0.003)                (0.003)                 -0.003
Land / K 1989 (firm) -0.266** -0.315*** -0.298** -0.290** -0.289**
(0.114)                 (0.121)                (0.124)                (0.124)                 -0.126
% Recent Purchase 0.124 0.106 0.127 0.143 0.142
(0.182)                 (0.184)                (0.186)                (0.185)                 -0.185
Security Holdings / Assets (1993) -0.002 0.027 0.051 0.052
-0.268 (0.271)                (0.274)                 -0.278
Export Sales / Sales (1993) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Access to the Public Bond Market -0.035 -0.031
(0.037)                (0.037)                
Top lender's Real Estate Exposure and Other Characteristics in 1989:
% Real Estate Loans 0.307 0.377 0.079 0.809 0.846
(0.750)                  -0.764 (0.856)                  -0.964 -1.105
% Land Holding -1.516** -1.502** -1.917*** -1.426* -1.679**
(0.697)                 (0.710)                (0.721)                (0.786)                 (0.853)          
Top Lender's Capital Ratio -3.8 -2.706 -3.711 3.64 3.439
(4.134)                 (4.163)                (4.276)                (5.432)                 (5.527)          
Top Lender's Loan Share -0.186* -0.130* -0.131*
(0.098)                (0.077)                 (0.077)          
% Real Estate Loans * CON 0.608
(0.770)                
% Land Holding * CON 0.797
(1.702)                
% Real Estate Loans * BIND -1.190a -1.246a
(0.909)                 (0.875)          
% Land Holding * BIND -0.43
(1.289)                 
Top Lender's Stock Market Exposure 0.030
(2.460)          
SOLD Equity Holdings 0.008
(0.243)            
Observations 476 448 448 448 448
R2 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
This table presents the effect of the top lender's real estate exposure on firm valuation based on OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the
buy-and-hold stock return between 1994 and 1998. Return (1986-1989) is the buy-and-hold stock return between 1986 and 1989. Beta is
calculated using monthly return during 1986-1989. Cash Flow (1986-89) / Assets is the cumulative cash flow between 1986 and 1989
normalized by the total assets in 1989. Land/K (firm) is the firm's market value of land normalized by the replacement cost of capital in 1989.
% Real Estate Loans are the loans to the real estate sector normalized by the total assets in 1989. % Land Holding is market value of land
normalized by the total assets in 1989 for the top lender. CON is a dummy variable indicating whether the top lender's loan share is above the
median. BIND is a dummy variable indicating whether the top lender's capital ratio in 1989 is below the capital requirement of 4%.
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are presented in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by a two-sided test is
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Significance at the 10% and 15% level by a one-sided test is indicated by a and b respectively.
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